Words and Reality
Tuesday, Sep 22, 2009
Scott Horton: Now, Robert Gibbs, the mouth of [President Obama] up there in Washington D.C says that …. “we have got to get the Iranians in our so called negotiations with them (that we’re very pessimistic they will go anywhere anyway) -- what’s at issue is their elicit nuclear weapons program,” which is a throwback to the propaganda line that the Bush crew [used].
Gareth Porter: Well, you have to take into account the reality that the kind of language that is used by official spokesman and spokesladies in the U.S. Government is so dishonest and so loose, that when they say elicit, it doesn't really mean much of anything more than, "Well, we disapprove of it. We don't accept it." In other words elicit doesn’t really have much of a real meaning apart from the politics of U.S. policy. I think that would be the point that I would make. You can't make too much of it simply because of the way words are used so loosely by this and every other administration. Unfortunately, that is the case. It’s sort of difficult to base too much analysis on the words, certainly of Whitehouse Spokesman more than anybody else -- they are so totally politicized, they really pay no attention to the relationship between words and reality.
Antiwar Radio: Scott Horton Interviews Gareth Porter on “IAEA Conceals Evidence Iran Documents Were Forged,” September 18, 2009, 13:30, http://antiwar.com/radio/2009/09/18/gareth-porter-65/.
The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has cooperated with the Agency in improving safeguards measures at FEP and in providing the Agency with access to the IR-40 reactor for purposes of design information verification. Iran has not, however, implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, on the early provision of design information.
Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.
Contrary to the requests of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Regrettably, the Agency has not been able to engage Iran in any substantive discussions about these outstanding issues for over a year. The Agency believes that it has provided Iran with sufficient access to documentation in its possession to enable Iran to respond substantively to the questions raised by the Agency.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohamed ElBaradei, August 28, 2009, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf.